Back to the Future: Myanmar's Junta takes a risky gamble.

It was not supposed to be like this. On February 1st Myanmar woke to find that the country's military had taken power, its democratically elected leaders arrested, and access to the Internet cut in vast swathes of the country. These actions marked a sharp reversal to the decade of democratic progress that Myanmar had made since its leading political activist Aung San Suu Kyi, was released in November 2010. In the intervening period, the country had enjoyed economic and political liberalization, with Suu Kyi elected to the de facto head of government as State Counsellor following her party's landslide victory elections in 2015. Five years later, Suu Kyi and her party repeated the victory with an increased majority dealing the country's military a stinging rebuke.

It was not supposed to be like this. When the country's military Junta drew up a new constitution for a disciplined democracy in 2008, they thought they had ensured their continued dominance of the country's political system. Indeed, at the time, democracy activists and human rights advocates decried the document as a sham and façade that would ensure military rule; after all, the constitution created institutional mechanisms that ensured the military's dominance in any future 'democratic' government. A quarter of seats in any future parliament were reserved for military appointees, as were the cabinet offices of Defense, Border Affairs, and the Home Ministry. Furthermore, by inserting a clause that stipulated that the President of the country could not have a foreign spouse or children, they ensured that icon Aung San Suu Kyi could never hold the highest executive post. If all else failed, they also ensured that amendments to the constitution would require a majority of 75 percent, which given the appointed members, would mean it would be all but impossible. The Junta was confident that such constitutional checks would not be needed. They had created a proxy party to represent them, the Union Solidarity and Development Party. The USDP would have the advantage of incumbent, cozy ties with the government and bureaucracy, and a well-organized nationwide network flush with funds. The opposition might have a charismatic and popular figurehead, but they could not match the institutional advantages the USDP would wield.

They were grossly mistaken. When elections were held for the first time in 2015, Suu Kyi and her party, The National League for Democracy, exceeded all expectations. The party humiliated the USDP, winning over 80 percent of the seats contested. After allowing for the military's reserved members, this gave the party a little over 60 percent of seats in the country's parliament. In contrast, the USDP won less than a third of the vote and only 41 seats in parliament.

Despite the reversal, the military leadership largely abided by the results. Much had been invested in the democratic process, and liberalization was already paying dividends economically and financially. Myanmar was no longer an international pariah; international sanctions were lifted, foreign direct investment was flowing into the country, as were record numbers of tourists. Since the military holds massive private economic holdings, they benefitted directly from these windfalls. Moreover, cautious to avoid a military backlash Suu Kyi chose to turn a blind eye to ethnic violence against the country's Muslim Rohingya population, a policy that provoked an international outcry.

Nevertheless, many within the senior military ranks were uneasy with the direction that the democratization process had taken. If further evidence was needed that their best-laid plans had gone awry the November 2020 elections provided it. These elections delivered yet another stinging rebuke for the military and another landslide for the National League for Democracy. Suu Kyi's party marginally increased its already whopping majority while the USDP saw its already small number of seats halved. The result meant that the NLD had an outright majority in both legislative chambers giving it control of law-making and the power to choose the President.  

The result was a bridge too far for the military's leadership. However, it is likely that the Junta has surveyed the regional and global climate and concluded that now is a potentially opportune moment to seize power. The United States is preoccupied with the Coronavirus pandemic and the deep political divisions exposed by President Trump's defeat. The new Biden administration is beset by numerous global challenges, including the Iranian nuclear program, unrest in Russia, and alliances that need repairing and rebuilding. Closer to home, Thailand has been under military rule since a coup in 2014 overthrew the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra. Despite condemnation of their action, the Thai government was not hit by economic or financial reprisals and has largely weathered the domestic and international opposition. Meanwhile, China has cracked down on opposition in Hong Kong. Pro-Beijing politicians passed a new security law leading to over 90 opposition figures' arrests and the freezing of activists' assets. Already hundreds have fled into exile, an exodus that many fear will increase sharply in the coming months. Before the coup, the political pendulum in Asia was already swinging towards greater authoritarianism.

The justification for the coup is all too familiar. Like President Trump in the United States, the military challenges the November election results citing massive widespread electoral fraud. Again like the United States, there is little evidence that electoral irregularities would have affected the result. Indeed, on January 29th, the country's Electoral Commission dismissed the military's claim that there were as many as 9 million irregularities across 300 plus townships. Despite this, these claims gave the military a pretext for overthrowing the government. Whether this intervention will be temporary, or like in Thailand, justify a prolonged period of military rule, remains to be seen. What it does reveal is how fragile Myanmar's fledgling democracy is. It will take firm resolve from the country's democratic activists and the international community to resist turning the clock back on Myanmar's progress thus far.